Hormuz buyer exposure matrix
Risk score methodology: Zero Carbon Analytics multiplied each country's share of Hormuz oil and LNG flows by its percentage of energy from fossil fuel imports, weighted by oil and gas share of those imports. This produces a relative vulnerability index — not an absolute measure, but a consistent comparative one.
| Country | ME oil dependency | Hormuz share of flows | Reserve cover | Alternatives | Exposure score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
1
🇯🇵
Japan ~2.8M bbl/d imports |
95%
|
10.9%of Hormuz flows |
254
days · IEA member
|
US LNG (limited, long-term contracts)
Russia pipeline (Sakhalin — partial)
No pipeline crude alternative
No domestic crude production
|
6.4
Critical
|
|
2
🇰🇷
South Korea ~2.7M bbl/d net imports |
70%
|
12.0%of Hormuz flows |
210
days · IEA member
|
US crude (diversifying rapidly)
West Africa light-sweet grades
No pipeline crude access
LNG: 2-4 weeks reserve only
|
5.3
High
|
|
3
🇮🇳
India ~5.4M bbl/d imports |
~60%
|
14.7%of Hormuz flows |
~60
days est.
|
Russia (Urals discount — active)
US crude (growing volumes)
West Africa grades (limited)
Domestic production: 0.8M bbl/d
|
4.9
High
|
|
4
🇨🇳
China ~11M bbl/d imports |
~50%
|
37.7%largest single share |
108
days (Kpler Jan 2026)
|
Russia pipeline (ESPO) — 1.6M bbl/d
Russia seaborne (Cape routing)
Iran (80% of Iran's exports)
Domestic: 4.3M bbl/d production
|
4.4
Moderate
|
|
5
🇪🇺
Europe (EU) Diversified import base |
~15%
|
<5%small Hormuz share |
90+
days · IEA mandate
|
Norway North Sea crude
US LNG + crude (growing)
West Africa light-sweet grades
LNG: TTF prices surging
|
2.1
Moderate
|
|
6
🇺🇸
United States Net oil exporter |
<5%
|
2.5%of Hormuz flows |
SPR
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
|
Domestic: 13.3M bbl/d production
Canada pipeline imports
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Net exporter — benefits from price rise
|
0.4
Low
|
The asymmetry is the story — not the price
The mainstream coverage of a Hormuz disruption focuses on the oil price. Brent at $80, $100, $120, $150. That framing misses the more important question: the same disruption produces radically different outcomes for different economies, and the most exposed economies are not the ones starting the war.
Japan imports 95% of its crude from the Middle East. It has 254 days of reserve cover, which sounds comfortable — but those reserves exist precisely because Japan has no alternatives. They are the buffer, not the solution. A disruption lasting longer than the time needed to negotiate emergency supply arrangements (weeks to months, not days) moves Japan from managed response to genuine supply crisis.
South Korea's exposure is acute in a different way. Its net oil imports represent 2.7% of GDP — among the highest ratios in the world. More specifically, South Korea's semiconductor manufacturing complex — which supplies the global electronics industry — is extraordinarily energy-intensive. A prolonged supply shock doesn't just raise Korean energy bills. It threatens Korean industrial output in a way that cascades through global supply chains. The Nikkei fell ~8% and Korea's KOSPI fell over 11% from conflict onset through March 10.
China's position is structurally different. It absorbs approximately 80% of Iranian crude exports, which gives it a plausible claim to preferential treatment from Tehran even in a closure scenario. It has Russian pipeline supply via ESPO. It has 108 days of crude stockpile at Kpler's January 2026 estimate. China is exposed — but it has options that Japan and South Korea simply do not have.
How each major buyer is managing
Saudi Aramco holds 8.2 million barrels in storage tanks on Okinawa — approximately three days of Japanese consumption — under a lease arrangement giving Japan preferential emergency access. JERA, Japan's largest LNG buyer, acts as government agent to secure minimum LNG shipments monthly.
Japan has not yet released strategic reserves. In 2022, reserves were released in IEA coordination following Russia's Ukraine invasion — the institutional mechanism exists. The question is duration: reserves buffer weeks to months, not an indefinite closure.
South Korea has activated a 100 trillion won (~$68bn) market stabilisation programme in response to war-related volatility. Net oil imports represent 2.7% of GDP — highest ratio among major economies — making it acutely sensitive to price shocks at the macroeconomic level.
KOSPI fell over 11% from conflict onset, with a circuit breaker triggered on 4 March. The semiconductor sector — Samsung, SK Hynix — faces both energy cost pressure and the helium supply constraint from the Ras Laffan disruption.
India has the most actively diversified import base of the major Asian buyers. Russian Urals at a substantial discount has been a feature of Indian buying since 2022 — India now receives significant Russian volumes via Cape routing. This provides genuine partial insulation.
India's reserve cover is materially lower than Japan or South Korea — estimated ~60 days — making it more sensitive to duration. Thailand and the Philippines are identified as the most vulnerable Southeast Asian economies given high import reliance and limited fiscal buffers.
China holds approximately 1.2 billion barrels of crude stockpile as of January 2026 — roughly 108 days of import cover even assuming zero new inflows. Russia supplies ~1.6M bbl/d via the ESPO pipeline, unaffected by Hormuz. China absorbs ~80% of Iranian crude, creating a plausible claim to preferential strait access.
Atlantic Council analysis: China would fare better than Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan — and the crisis may empower Beijing relative to regional rivals, particularly if LNG outages disproportionately hit Japan and South Korea.
What the oil price doesn't capture
The Strait of Hormuz is a chokepoint for an interlocking web of commodity flows that extends far beyond crude oil. The mainstream coverage tracks the Brent price. The expert tracks what else moves through that corridor.
LNG: Approximately 20% of global LNG trade passes through Hormuz, overwhelmingly from Qatar. One-fifth of global LNG is currently disrupted or severely repriced. Dutch TTF prices are up more than 50% against pre-conflict levels. Japan and South Korea, already exposed on oil, hold only 2–4 weeks of LNG reserve. This is a separate and simultaneous shock.
Fertilisers: The Gulf is a major artery for urea, ammonia, and sulphur — the inputs for synthetic fertilisers. Urea prices have increased approximately 30% since the conflict began. This is a food system shock operating on a longer timeline than the oil shock but with potentially more severe consequences for import-dependent food markets in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia.
Helium: Qatar's Ras Laffan produces approximately one-third of global helium. The facility was struck in early March 2026. Helium is essential for semiconductor manufacturing, MRI machines, and other high-precision industrial uses. There is no short-term substitute for helium in these applications. South Korea and Taiwan — the world's dominant semiconductor fabricators — face a supply constraint that no amount of oil reserve drawdown can address.